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Abortion. It is one of the most divisive issues of our time.... To some
it is nothing less than the slaughter of millions upon millions of the
most innocent and vulnerable of all victims, and thus stands as the most
monstrous moral outrage in human history. To others it tests our
society's commitment to fundamental principles of individual liberty,
personal autonomy, and women's welfare.'
Many women view the 1973 United States Supreme Court decision in
Roe v. Wade2 as the culmination of a battle for women's rights that began
before the Civil War.3 However, the holding in Roe, that a woman's right
1. DONALD P. JUDGES, HARD CHOICES, LOST VOICES 4 (1993). For a strong feminist
point of view, see Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 981 (1984) ("Only women have abortions. Laws restricting access to abortion have a
devastating sex-specific impact").
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See John W. Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and Operation Rescue: A Historical and
TheoreticalAnalysis, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 77, 79 (1991) (quoting ELLEN C. DuBois,
FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN
1
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to privacy includes a qualified right to abortion, did not settle the controver-
sy concerning termination of a pregnancy in its early stages Instead, less
than twenty years later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,5 the Court
dismantled the trimester scheme outlined in Roe, although it affirmed the
constitutional right to abortion.' Since Casey, access to abortion is
governed by a test that condones numerous restrictions on a woman's
freedom of choice.7
The decisions in Casey and Roe constitute the goal posts at the opposite
ends of the playing field. In between, many judicial decisions delineate
yards gained or lost in the ongoing struggle for unchecked access to
abortion This legal battle is kept alive by feminist groups such as the
National Organization of Women ("NOW") and Planned Parenthood on
behalf of women seeking abortions.9 Their opponents are the groups and
AMERICA 1848-1869, at 22 (1978)). DuBois enumerates two sources as providing the
impetus for women to unite: women's "growing awareness of their common conditions and
grievances" in the decade preceding the Civil War and the abolitionists' emphasis on
universal equality. Id. at 79 n.16.
4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. The trimester test is governed by the point of fetal viability,
the point at which the State's interest in the health of the mother becomes compelling. Id.
at 163. When the Court heard the case 20 years ago, medical knowledge pinpointed viability
at the end of the first trimester of the pregnancy. Id. Thus, the Court divided pregnancy into
trimesters, leaving the decision as to abortion in the hands of the woman's physician in the
first trimester; allowing the state to regulate abortion in the second trimester; and permitting
abortions in the third trimester only "for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
Id. at 163-64.
5. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
6. Id. at 2818. In place of the trimester scheme, the Court instituted an "undue burden"
test, specifying that "[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an
abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden." Id. at 2821. But the opinion
gave little guidance as to the meaning of "undue."
7. The Court held that the following restrictions are constitutional: a 24 hour waiting
period to meet an informed consent requirement; parental consent for unemancipated women
under 18; and record keeping and reporting requirements for abortion facilities other than
those which would require spousal notice or consent. Id. at 2791.
8. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494. 1496
n. 13 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev 'd in part and vacated in part
sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (discussing
subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the Roe holding prior to
Casey). The decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.492 U.S. 490 (1989), was
perhaps the most noteworthy prior to Casey. The decision was pivotal because it allowed
State regulation of abortion in the second trimester for protection of the fetus rather than the
mother. JUDGES, supra note 1, at 190.
9. See John H. Henn & Maria Del Monaco, CivilRights andRICO: Stopping Operation
Rescue, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 255 n.19 (1990). Henn and Del Monaco list cases in
1084 Vol. 19
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individuals whose avowed purposes are to discourage pregnant women from
seeking abortions and to close down abortion clinics."0 Their objective is
ultimately to make it impossible for women to terminate a pregnancy legally
in the United States."
To accomplish this purpose, abortion protestors, often under the aegis
of the militant group known as Operation Rescue, 2 began a systematic,
national campaign to obstruct access to abortion services in 1988.13 During
the blockades, abortion protestors disrupt the provision of medical and
counseling services and exhort patients, clinic personnel, and bystanders to
join the illegal activity. 4 In addition, the "rescuers" vandalize clinic
property, often defacing signs and disrupting traffic near the clinic by
spreading nails on the asphalt to deflate tires so that immobilized vehicles
barricade the clinic entrances. 5 Leaders of the anti-abortion movement
justify these illegal activities by invoking biblical passages and comparing
their mission to end abortion to the struggle for freedom and equality waged
by Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.'6 Because the movement is
nationwide, Congress has decided the solution to ensuring women's access
to abortion facilities should be embodied in federal legislation. 7
which courts have issued injunctions against clinic blockaders; of the 10 cases cited, at least
six involved NOW or Planned Parenthood as plaintiffs. Id.
10. See Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1487-88. The trial court found the "principal
goals [of the defendant anti-abortionists] are to stop abortion and to end its legalization." Id.
at 1487; see also Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia portrays
Operation Rescue, one of the petitioners, as "an unincorporated association whose members
oppose abortion .... [It] organizes antiabortion [sic] demonstrations in which participants
trespass on, and obstruct general access to, the premises of abortion clinics." Id.
11. Elizabeth L. Crane, Abortion Clinics and Their Antagonists: Protection from
Protestors Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (1993).
12. See generally David Van Biema, In Your Town, in Your Face, TIME, July 19, 1993,
at 29 (recounting Operation Rescue's history and goals). Four years earlier, the magazine
described Operation Rescueprotestors favorably as"crusaders" and "uterine warriors." Garry
Wills, "Save the Babies:" Operation Rescue: A Case Study in Galvanizing the Antiabortion
Movement, TIME, May 1, 1989, at 26. The group's religious roots are evidenced by its name,
which comes from a passage in the Bible: "Rescue those who are being taken away." Id.
at 28 (citing Proverbs 24:11).
13. Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 9, at 253.
14. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
16. See Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89, 90 n.100 ("The strategy of Operation Rescue
is massive civil disobedience in the tradition of Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, and
Martin Luther King, Jr.") (citations omitted).
17. See Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108
Stat. 694 (to be codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 248).
1995] 1085
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This new legislation will have an impact on Operation Rescue and its
supporters as parties to much of the recent litigation in the abortion
controversy.18 Part II of this article begins with an overview of this high-
profile anti-abortion group, and includes an analysis of Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 9 the case which spurred Congress to pass the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 ("FACE").2" Part III
examines the legislative history of FACE chronicled in congressional
committee reports and the Congressional Record as the Act wound through
the House and the Senate. The search through the legislative record is
instructive in understanding FACE and what it meant to accomplish. Part
IV surveys the First Amendment arguments adressed in Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, Inc.21 In Madsen, three members of Operation Rescue
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to overturn a Florida Supreme
Court decision favoring the owners of a Melbourne, Florida abortion
facility.22 Despite the gradual dismemberment of the holding in Roe v.
Wade, the latest judicial decisions have affirmed that a woman's right to an
abortion is constitutionally guaranteed.2"
18. See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 800 (1994)
(describing the respondent, Joseph Scheidler, as opposing legal abortion); New York State
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing as defendants
both Randall Terry and Operation Rescue); Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
19. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
20. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694; see also Neal Devins, Through the Looking
Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us About American Politics, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 293, 301
(1994) (reviewing BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN
POLMCS (1993)) (stating that Congress intends the Act to void the Court's holding in Bray).
The Senate sent the bill to President Clinton for signature on May 12, 1994, and the President
signed it into law on May 26, 1994. See Foes Sue Over Abortion-Protest Law, SUN-
SENTINEL, May 27, 1994, at 3A [hereinafter Foes]; see also 140 CONG. REC. S5628 (1994)
(giving the roll call in the Senate as 69 vote for and 30 vote against passage of FACE);
Clinic Access: Senate Sends Prez StiffFACE; Challenge Looms, Abortion Report, May 13,
1994, available in LEXIS. Cmpgn Library, Abtrpt File [hereinafter Clinic Access].
21. 114 S. Ct. 2521 (1994).
22. Id.
23. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516; Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 798; see also Operation Rescue,
726 F. Supp. at 1494 n.13 (listing United States Supreme Court decisions that restricted the
scope of Roe); infra note 225.
1086 Vol. 19
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A. Operation Rescue: The New Civil Disobedience
Although one commentator maintained that "civil disobedience is in
fact obedience, that it respects the law and is within the law,"'24 another
defined it as "an illegal public protest, non-violent [sic] in character."25
Operation Rescue has devised a specific type of civil disobedience to
influence governmental policy and to persuade the general public of the
righteousness of its cause: preventing access to abortion clinics by forming
human barricades at the doorways. 26 Viewed historically, the anti-abortion
movement is the latest in a series of national campaigns to use civil
disobedience to hasten social and political change. 2' Today, because of the
violence of its tactics and the resulting polarization of public opinion,
Operation Rescue clinic entrance blockades command considerable media
coverage; the pronouncements and arrests of its organizers provide headlines
for the local and national press.28
24. Symposium, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 21 RUTGERs L. REV. 1, 17 (1966)
(section written by Harrop A. Freeman). Freeman concludes:
When [the protestor] has decided that the highest demands of law, the highest
morality, the highest values of humanity require a specific law to be challenged
(and particularly when there is no other effective way for him to do so) then the
conscientious citizen must humbly and contritely but courageously engage in
civil disobedience.
Id. at 26.
25. Id. at 3 (section written by Carl Cohen).
26. Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 9, at 251-53.
27. See Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89. Whitehead discusses American protest
movements beginning with the colonial protest against the British Stamp Act prior to the
American Revolution, and including abolition of slavery, women's rights, civil rights, anti-
Vietnam protests, and anti-vivisection demonstrations. Id. at 77-89. Positioning Operation
Rescue as the culmination of this list of milestones that helped shape the American political
system perhaps clothes the anti-abortion movement in historical legitimacy it does not
deserve.
28. See generally Abortion Report, supra note 20. The Report, updated daily, compiles
news clips from major newspapers on abortion issues of national interest. For example, a
summary of an editorial in the Milwaukee Sentinel on June 8, 1994, concerning the arrest of
seven abortion protestors who blockaded the entrance to a Milwaukee abortion clinic, states
that United States Attorney Thomas Schneider is "correct in his assessment that this is a clear
matter for a few individuals taking it upon themselves to deny the women involved their
constitutional right to an abortion." Id. (daily ed. June 13, 1994) (quoting the Milwaukee
Sentinel). The protestors were charged with violation of the newly-signed Freedom of Access
1995] 1087
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Prior to Roe, opponents of abortion were organized into lobbying and
educational groups and were supported by the Roman Catholic Church.29
The abortion protests consisted of peaceful marches; "[c]ivil disobedience
was not their style."3 After Roe, Catholics began to sit in at clinics.3'
Randall Terry32 met two of the leaders of these passive protests in 1986,
and by 1987 he had organized Operation Rescue into a viable organization,
drawing members mainly from among evangelical Protestants.33
The first "rescue"34 was on November 28, 1987, in Cherry Hill, New
Jersey.35 The success of the event, in which 300 rescuers participated in
preventing the performance of abortions by blocking access to the clinic for
the day, convinced two other clinics to shut their doors voluntarily.
36
Furthermore, other anti-abortion groups copied Operation Rescue's methods
to Clinic Entrances Act. Id. The same issue of the Report also quoted a New York Times
article under the heading, Hunters Seek FACE, the Cincinnati Enquirer on abortion protests
in Cincinnati, as well as the Milwaukee Journal on the arrest of the seven clinic blockaders.
Id.
29. Wills, supra note 12, at 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Terry was a high school dropout raised in New York by his mother and two aunts
who were ardent feminists. Michael P. O'Brien, Note, Operation Rescue Blockades and the
Misuse of 42 U.SC. § 1985(3), 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 145, 145 n.1 (1993) (quoting Sue
Hutchison & James N. Baker, The Right-to-Life Shock Troops, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at
32). After moving to Texas to become a rock star, he experienced a religious conversion and
became an evangelical minister. Id. Terry, who is now a superstar of the anti-abortion
movement, began his career as an abortion protestor by talking with patients outside an
abortion clinic during breaks from his job as a used car salesman. Henn & Del Monaco,
supra note 9, at 253; Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89 n.98 (citation omitted), see also Sandra
G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors 'Home Lives: Illegal Intimidation or Protected
Protest?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al (depicting Terry as "the nation's best-known
antiabortion [sic] leader"). The conversations with patients then escalated to picketing outside
the clinic with others who objected to the performance of abortions inside the facility.
Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89 n.98 (citation omitted). Terry eventually aligned himself with
the anti-abortion movement and became a disciple of Joseph Scheidler, who heads the Pro-
Life Action League and has been active in the anti-abortion movement since 1973.
Boodman, supra, at Al; see also cases cited supra note 18.
33. Wills. supra note 12, at 28.
34. "In general, a 'rescue' is a demonstration at the site of a clinic where abortions are
performed. At a 'rescue,' the demonstrators, called 'rescuers,' intentionally trespass on the
clinic's premises for the purpose of blockading the clinic's entrances and exits, thereby
effectively closing the clinic." Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1487.
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so that clinic blockades evolved into a national phenomenon." Since
1987, their obstructionist tactics have put Operation Rescue and its support-
ers in the forefront of the abortion controversy.
Operation Rescue's tactics include packing rescuers around doors to
abortion clinics so no one can enter or leave the facility.38 The abortion
protestors at a 1989 clinic blockade in California were depicted as moving
"in a human sludge, on their knees, not standing," to avoid direct confronta-
tion with the pro-choice demonstrators. 9 In the first year after its found-
ing, Operation Rescue staged hundreds of such nonviolent actions, and
police arrested thousands of the protestors.4" By 1991, the group was so
well-organized that it nearly paralyzed Wichita, Kansas with a clinic
blockade that lasted forty-six days.4 ' Operation Rescue has subsequently
stayed in the headlines with widespread summer protests, such as the recent
"Cities of Refuge" campaign in 1993, which targeted seven urban areas.42
Terry's strategy evolved into activist protest: He and his followers put
aside speeches and placards in favor of trespass and other forms of civil
disobedience that lead to massive arrests.43 His goal is to force the
government to rescind its support of the pro-abortion stance of the courts. 4
Terry designs anti-abortion demonstrations to pit modem civil disobedience
against the constitutionally-sanctioned freedom of choice for women.
In the last twelve years, abortion protests have become violent,
culminating in the shooting deaths of two doctors, two clinic workers, and
37. Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 9, at 254.
38. Wills, supra note 12, at 27. Wills describes the jockeying for media attention during
the blockades, with the pro-choice protestors trying to dominate the TV cameras' footage of
the event with their own placards: "It is a noisy scene, hymns vs. chanted slogans, with both
sides resorting to bullhorns to get above the din (and the police finally adding their
loudspeakers)." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89 (noting that by 1989 Operation Rescue
had branches in 200 cities and 35,000 members).
41. Van Biema, supra note 12, at 29.
42. Id.
43. See Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 9, at 254-55 & nn.19-20, 256 (listing cases
granting injunctions against clinic blockaders and cases in which contempt orders were issued
for violations of the injunctions).
44. "Terry has framed the issue in stark terms, asking, 'When the government has to
decide between jailing tens of thousands of people and making abortion illegal again, what
do you think it's going to do?' Id. at 256 (quoting Michael Matza, Throw this Man in Jail,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER MAG., June 26, 1988, at 20, 22).
1995] 1089
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an abortion-provider's bodyguard since March 1993."5 Three of the five
killings occurred in Pensacola, Florida.46 David Gunn, a physician, was
killed on March 10, 1993, as he arrived at the Women's Medical Services
clinic in Pensacola.47 On July 29, 1994, John Britton, a doctor who
worked at The Ladies Center in Pensacola, and his voluntary escort, James
Barrett, were fatally shot while sitting in the front seat of a pickup truck
outside the clinic.48 Barrett's wife, June, who was sitting in the rear of the
truck, was wounded in the left arm. 49 A third physician, Dr. George Tiller,
was wounded at an abortion clinic in Wichita, Kansas in August 1993.50
The most recent violence also claimed the most victims in a single
shooting spree. Two clinic staff members, Shannon Lowney and Lee Ann
Nichols, were murdered and five others were wounded on December 30,
1994, in an attack on two suburban Boston, Massachusetts clinics.5 ' The
rampage continued the next day in Norfolk, Virginia until the gunman was
arrested after firing shots at a third clinic. 2
The person responsible for the July 1994 shooting deaths in Pensacola,
Paul Hill, gained notoriety as the first offender charged with violation of
FACE. On October 5, 1994, after a three-day trial, a federal jury convicted
Hill of two counts for killing Britton and Barrett, a third count for the
wounding of June Barrett, and a fourth count for using a firearm. 3 In
Boston, federal prosecutors are considering whether to charge John Salvi
with violations of FACE.5 4 Massachusetts state attorneys are seeking life
45. "[T]he tally of violence over the past 12 years includes 123 cases of arson and 37
bombings in 33 states, and more than 1,500 cases of stalking, assault, sabotage and burglary"
nationwide, according to federal statistics. Laurie Goodstein, Clinic Killings Follow Years
of Antiabortion Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al.
46. Ann O'Hanlon, Pensacola's Chain of Violence, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at A4;
see also Foes, supra note 20, at A3.
47. O'Hanlon, supra note 46, at A4.
48. William Claiborne, Two Killed at Clinic in Florida: RadicalAbortion Foe Charged
in Shootings, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at Al.
49. Id.
50. Don Phillips, Violence Hardly Ruffled Protest Ritual: Foes, Supporters ofAbortion
Rights Resume Routine at Kansas Clinic, WASH. POST, August 22, 1993, at A8.
51. Christopher B. Daly, Salvi Denies Murder Charges in Shooting Attacks on
Massachusetts Clinics, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1995, at A3; Pamela Ferdinand, Salvi Acted
Alone, DA Says; Detailed Plan Alleged in Deadly Clinic Attack, BOSTON GLOBE. Feb. 16.
1995, at 29.
52. Daly, supra note 51, at A3.
53. FACE Trial: Hill Is the First Convicted Under New Act, Abortion Report, October
6, 1994, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Abtrpt File.
54. Daly, supra note 51, at A3.
1090 Vol. 19
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imprisonment for Salvi, who is charged with two counts of murder and five
counts of attempted murder.5
By passing FACE, which criminalizes the use of force, threats, or
blockades to intimidate or to interfere with women seeking abortions or with
abortion providers, Congress has increased the cost to protestors for
obstructing access to clinics and to abortion services. 6 The government
hopes to quell the rising violence of the protests without infringing the
rights of the protestors. Whether this escalation of liability will deter Terry
and his supporters depends on whether their judicial attacks on the law's
constitutionality will succeed. 7
B. The Bray Decision: A Misguided First
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,5" decided on January 13,
1993, was the first Supreme Court case to apply 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)' 9 to
abortion clinic blockaders. The statute provides a federal cause of action to
those deprived of their constitutional rights against persons conspiring to
55. Id.
56. 108 Stat. at 694.
57. See Foes, supra note 20, at 3A (reporting that two anti-abortion groups filed suits
challenging the Act's constitutionality immediately after the Act took effect).
58. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
59. The section reads as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the
purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory
the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent
by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote,
from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice
President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any
citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
1995] 1091
9
Franco: Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994: The  Face of T
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws."6 Bray was also the first consideration by the Court of a claim
based on the "hindrance clause," the second clause of § 1985(3).61
Section 1985(3) was originally enacted as section 2 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.62 The 1871 Act "was
a response to the massive, organized lawlessness that infected our Southern
States" during Reconstruction, and it contained both a criminal and a civil
component.63 Its modem equivalent is twofold: § 1985(3) applies to the
infringement of civil rights, and 18 U.S.C. § 241 outlines the criminal
sanctions available against conspirators who deprive persons of the right to
equal protection.64
The respondents in Bray were nine clinics that performed abortions or
provided abortion counseling in the greater Washington, D.C. area, and five
organizations that supported free access to abortion.65 The petitioners were
Operation Rescue 66 and six individuals who opposed the voluntary termina-
tion of pregnancy and dedicated themselves to actions that would prevent
the further sanctioning of abortion.67 The respondents sought an injunction
to prevent the petitioners from trespassing on the premises of abortion
clinics in or around Washington, D.C. or from preventing access to those
60. Id.
61. Marjorie Richter, Comment, Blinking at Reality: An Examination of Bray v.
Alexandria, 20 HASTTNGS CONST. L.Q. 905, 910-11 (1993) (containing an excellent
discussion of the Bray case).
62. Id. at 911; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836
(1983) ("The central theme of the bill's proponents was that the Klan and others were
forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them equal access to political
power. The predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus against
Negroes and their supporters."). See generally JUDGES, supra note 1, at 264 (discussing the
Bray decision). Richter also points out that the Bray opinions call it "The Ku Klux Act of
1871," rather than the more common "Ku Klux Klan Act." See, e.g., Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 779
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Richter, supra note 61, at 911 n.44.
63. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Richter, supra note 61, at
911 (detailing the statutory history of § 1985(3)). Justice Stevens explained that in deciding
whether to apply the statute, the Court should consider "whether the controversy has a purely
local character or the kind of federal dimension that gave rise to the legislation." Bray, 113
S. Ct. at 779.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) (sanctioning fines of up to $10,000 and imprisonment of up'
to 10 years for each violation).
65. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1487.
66. See discussion of Operation Rescue supra part II.A.
67. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1488.
Vol. 191092
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clinics by patients and staff.6" The lower court granted injunctive relief,
and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed its decision, adding
that abortion protestors had "crossed the line from persuasion into coercion"
by denying the respondents their legal rights.69
For the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Thomas
joined. According to the majority, the sole question presented to the
Supreme Court was "whether the first clause [the "deprivation" clause] of
• . . § 1985(3) . ..provides a federal cause of action against persons
obstructing access to abortion clinics."7 Thus, as one commentator was
careful to highlight, the Court limited the legal question in Bray to "the
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear blockade cases rather than the status of
abortion rights themselves."'"
Relying on two precedents72 for an interpretation of the statute, the
majority stated that for a private conspiracy to violate the deprivation clause,
a plaintiff must prove that "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action."'73
The plaintiff must also show that the goal of the conspiracy is to interfere
with rights that are protected against private and governmental infringe-
ment.74
68. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at 584; Operation Rescue,726 F. Supp. at 1486, 1496-
97.
69. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at 585; Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1486, 1496-
97. The trial court granted the injunction because of interference with the plaintiffs'
constitutional right to interstate travel and defendants' violation of the Virginia state law
prohibiting trespass and Virginia common law against creation of a public nuisance. Id. at
1493-95. However, the court rejected, on First Amendment grounds, the plaintiffs' request
for an injunction against the activities of abortion protestors "that tend to intimidate, harass
or disturb patients or potential patients of the clinics." Id. at 1497.
70. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 757-58.
71. JUDGES, supra note 1, at 264.
72. The two cases the Bray Court based its opinion were Griffin v. Breckenridge and
Carpenters. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758, 763 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)
and Carpenters,463 U.S. at 825). In Griffin, three African-American plaintiffs sued a group
of whites for attacking them on a public highway. The Court held that private conspiracies
could violate 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Richter, supra note 61, at 913 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S.
at 89-92, 107). While Griffin broadened the scope of § 1985(3), the Court in Carpenters
voted five to four that the statute does not cover conspiracies against economic groups and
therefore cannot be applied to prejudice against non-union employees, thus narrowing the
reach of the statute. Id. at 915 (citing Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 838).
73. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102).
74. Id. at 758 (quoting Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833).
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The Court held that the respondents met neither of these two require-
ments.75 The first element, requiring a "class-based, invidiously discrimi-
natory animus," was not satisfied because, contrary to what the district court
had found, women wanting to terminate a pregnancy are not a class within
the meaning of § 1985(3).76 Furthermore, the Court asserted that the
protestors opposed abortion and not women, so that they were not motivated
by gender discrimination." The second element, requiring a violation of
protected rights, was also unsatisfied. Of the two constitutional rights cited,
the right to interstate travel and the right to abortion, the former, although
protected against private conspirators, was only incidentally affected.78
The Court held that a right not directly affected does not constitute a
sufficient basis for proving discriminatory animus. 79 In addition, the right
to abortion, while targeted by the petitioners, is not protected against private
interference.8" Because neither element was satisfied, the majority
concluded that the respondents' § 1985(3) deprivation claim failed.8"
Even more damaging to the pro-choicers was the Court's unwillingness
to rule on the hindrance clause claim. 2 In contrast, the three dissenting
75. Id.
76. Id. at 759. Justice Scalia maintained that although it is unclear what the term "class"
encompasses beyond a class defined by the race of its members as the term was used in
Griffin, it must mean more than a group of persons engaged in conduct of which the
defendant being tried under § 1985(3) disapproves. Id. Because it reasoned that the protests
did not target women as a class, the Court also declined to rule whether women qualify as
a class for purposes of the conspiracies that § 1985(3) prohibits. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
Thus, the Court did not interpret the hesitant "perhaps" left undefined in Griffin and did not
shed light on whether class-based discrimination under the statute can include gender
discrimination, as well as racial prejudice. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759-60. Justice Scalia explained that "[w]hatever one thinks of
abortion, it cannot be denied that there are common and respectable reasons for opposing it,
other than hatred of or condescension toward ... women as a class .... " Id. at 760. He
did not, however, list those reasons.
78. Id. at 762; see also Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1494. In Operation Rescue,
the trial court deliberately sidestepped the abortion issue, reasoning that the holding in
Webster suggested that a woman's right to abortion may no longer be constitutionally
guaranteed. Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that in order to resolve the instant
case, "it is unnecessary and imprudent to venture into this thicket." Id.
79. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
80. Id. at 764.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 764-65. Justice Scalia noted that a claim based on the second clause of §
1985(3) had never been presented to the Court for resolution. Id. at 767. But quixotically
he proceeded to give a substantial analysis of the claim, as if it were before the Court. Bray,
113 S. Ct. at 765. He concluded that a close reading of the statute makes it clear that a
1094 Vol. 19
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opinions all agreed that the petitioners had violated the second clause of §
1985(3)." The hindrance clause bans any protest which seeks to hinder
the state authorities from protecting the rights of persons in the state.84
Thus, the Court cut off access to both sections of the statute as a legal
framework for putting an end to the abortion protests, "the kind of zealous,
politically motivated, lawless conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku
Klux Klan Act in 1871 and gave it its name. 85
According to the dissenting justices, the majority refused to apply either
clause of § 1985(3) because it erroneously assumed that the issue in dispute
was the defendants' opposition to abortion.86 The dissenters argued
vigorously that this case was only superficially about abortion. They
claimed that the substantive issue before the Court was whether the
government could use its authority to end a national conspiracy based on
disregard for the law.87 They further asserted that the Court could have
ensured protection of a woman's right to abortion from those who want the
government to rescind that right. Instead, by reversing the district court's
decision to grant injunctive relief, the Court condoned the anti-abortionists
conduct directed at preventing every woman from taking advantage of the
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy. 8 As the dissenting
opinions aptly demonstrated, the majority sidestepped a historic opportunity
to invoke federal jurisdiction over abortion protestors, who have become
"organized and violent mobs across the country."89
hindrance clause claim required the same two elements as the deprivation clause claim and
therefore would fail for the same two reasons: a lack of class-based animus, and the absence
of a right protected against private conspiracies. Id. at 765-67.
83. Id. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 795 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), 805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter concluded that the finding of a
violation of the hindrance clause, which he called the prevention clause, required express
clarification from the district court and recommended that the case be remanded for that
purpose. Id. at 769. Justice Stevens stated his opinion more forcefully; he asserted that the
respondents unquestionably proved a hindrance clause claim. Id. at 795 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
85. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 798.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 788.
89. Id. at 780.
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By foregoing this opportunity, the Supreme Court in Bray yielded its
judicial lawmaking authority to the legislative branch, allowing Congress to
draw the line between legal clinic picketing and illegal clinic blockades.9"
III. FACE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Abortion Politics
In the years preceding the Roe v. Wade9' decision, the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government kept a low profile in the
abortion controversy, allowing the states to regulate the issue.92 Since Roe,
and until recently, although Congress initiated a remarkable number of
proposals affecting abortion, "abortion politics [was] a controversy where
rarely have so many public officials worked so hard to say so little about an
issue on the minds of so many citizens."93
Examination of legislative records show that in the past two decades
Congress has confronted the abortion issue itself only indirectly.94 Of note
are the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 19789' and the
enactment of the Adolescent Family Life ("AFL") Demonstration Projects
in 1981,96 also known as the Chastity Act.97  The ban on employer
90. See 108 Stat. 694: see also infra note 193 and accompanying text (distinguishing
between peaceful picketing and violent obstruction).
91. 410 U.S. at 113.
92. Devins, supra note 20, at 294. Through the 1960s, following a 100 years of political
inaction, 23 states changed their abortion legislation, four by repealing their abortion laws and
19 by liberalizing them. Id. (citations omitted). Devins also indicates that even when
Congress acted on abortion prior to Roe, it did no more than "preserve the anti-abortion
status quo ante." Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 295 & n. 15 (citing Amy Gutmann, No Common Ground, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.
22, 1990, at 43).
94. Although Congress has not acted to codify the holding in Roe granting women a
right to abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy prior to fetus viability, a pro-choice
initiative, known as the Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, was introduced in the first session
of the 102d Congress. Devins, supra note 20, at 298 & n.23 (citing H.R. 25, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991)). Currently, the initiative is pending in both the House and the Senate. Bill
Tracking Report, H.R. 25 and S. 25, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck File. The Act
would prevent a state from restricting a woman's right to choose abortion either prior to fetal
viability or whenever the woman's life or health is threatened by the pregnancy. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
96. Id. § 300z-10. The legislation provides that "grants may be made only to projects
or programs which do not advocate, promote, or encourage abortion." Id. § 300z-10(a).
97. See generally Devins, supra note 20, at 301. Devins cites these two pieces of
legislation as examples of Congress refraining from restricting abortion funding and defeating
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discrimination against pregnant women broadened the scope of rights
afforded to working women, by equating pregnancy discrimination with
gender discrimination.98 But in addition to this praiseworthy achievement,
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act also allowed employers to exclude
abortions from health insurance benefits.99 The AFL Demonstration
Projects legislation attempted to discourage unwanted pregnancies, and
hence the need for abortions, by providing religious groups with federal
funding to promote sexual abstinence among teenagers.' 0 Under closer
scrutiny, it is clear that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act encourages a
woman to give birth rather than to abort the fetus, and the AFL legislation
advocated abstinence, thereby averting the need for abortion.'0 Both acts
illustrate the conservative posture of Congress regarding abortion rights.
Otherwise, legislative activity has consisted mostly of placing
limitations on abortion funding, although Congress has avoided legislating
actual restrictions on access to abortion services. Beginning in 1976,
Congress started cutting off Medicaid funds for abortions. 02 Legislators
stopped funding abortion services in federal programs on family planning,
American assistance to foreign countries, legal aid, arhied forces hospitals,
and prisons, as well as limited the funds for abortions in the District of
Columbia.'0 3 Because of this lack of federal funding, unrestricted access
to abortion has receded further and further from the reach of economically
disadvantaged women who are often in the greatest need of federally
subsidized abortion services.
Although Congress has not shifted its position on abortion funding
restriction for several reasons, the recent enactment of the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 marks a turning point in congres-
sional involvement in abortion politics. First, by criminalizing violence and
the threat of violence at abortion clinic entrances, FACE safeguards a
woman's right to receive abortion services. Second, the fact that the anti-
abortion and pro-choice factions of Congress could agree on the need for
FACE reveals a congressional consensus that a woman's right to choose
should be free from physical intimidation. Third, by providing federal
legislation, Congress has acknowledged that the problem of abortion clinic
attempts to overrule the Supreme Court holding in Roe. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
99. Id.
100. Devins, supra note 20, at 301.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 300 (citing material from CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 20, at 110-37).
103. Id. (citing material from CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 20, at 112-13, 131).
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blockades is now a national problem that can best be handled on the
national level. With the enactment of FACE, the federal legislative and
executive branches have finally confronted the abortion issue squarely and
discovered that a limited compromise is possible.
B. Evolution of FACE
A bill similar to the House of Representatives version of the enacted
law was first introduced in Congress in 1992."4 The House Subcommit-
tee on Crime and Criminal Justice conducted a hearing on the proposal on
May 6, 1992.'05 The Subcommittee heard testimony on the abortion clinic
blockades and protests that had disrupted health care services both in
Wichita, Kansas during the summer of 1991 and in Buffalo, New York, in
the spring of 1992.106 Both the violence and the national scope of these
demonstrations brought obstruction of clinic access to the attention of
federal lawmakers. 7 The House did not have the opportunity to consider
enactment of House Bill 1703 in 1992, but the bill paved the way for further
action in the 103d Congress. House Bill 796 was introduced on February
3, 1993, as the next version of FACE.'08
Although the House took initiative by introducing a bill to address the
rising violence of the ongoing abortion protests, it was the Senate proposal,
Senate Bill 636, which was presented to the President on May 17, 1994.109
President Clinton signed the bill into law on May 26, 1994, which was
entered into the Congressional Record on June 7, 1994."10 Senator
Edward M. Kennedy introduced the bill on the Senate floor on March 23,
1993, and that same day it was referred to the Senate Labor and Human
104. H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.-




108. H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 139 CONG. REC. H483 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1993); see also Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, BLT103 (containing a synopsis of the bill's progress through the House from
its introduction on Feb. 3, 1993, to the last action taken on Mar. 17, 1994, when House Bill
796 was incorporated into Senate Bill 636).
109. S. 636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see generally Bill Tracking Report, S. 636,
103d Cong., 1st Sess., available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLT103 (containing a synopsis
of the bill's progress through the Senate from its introduction on March 23, 1993, to the final
action taken on June 7, 1994, when the newly signed law was entered into the Congressional
record).
110. Bill Tracking Report, S. 636, supra note 108.
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Resources Committee for consideration."' In his remarks, the senator
noted the grisly statistics in the war being waged against free access to
abortion facilities: "Over 100 clinics have been torched or bombed in the
past 15 years. Over 300 have been invaded and over 400 have been
vandalized. Already this year, clinics have sustained more than $1.3 million
in damage from arson alone.""' He then stressed that only federally
enacted laws can stop the rising toll of "nationwide extremist acts" and the
resulting damage to property and to the well-being of clinic patients and
staff."3 The senator's statement echoed that of William S. Sessions,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who wrote prior to the
enactment of FACE that current federal legislation was inadequate to handle
the violent obstruction of abortion clinic entrances. "' Although it took
another fourteen months for the bill to become law, the majority of the
members of Congress eventually agreed with Senator Kennedy that the
situation demanded action on the federal level.
The text of the bill printed in the record at the request of Senator
Kennedy contained a section, since expunged," 5 outlining the congressio-
nal findings," 6 and represented the initial version of Senate Bill 636,
111. 139 CONG. REC. S3523-25 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993) (containing the full text of the
original version of Senate Bill 636); see also id. at S3479 (referring the bill to the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources). Senator Kennedy's introductory remarks included the
following statement: "Mr. President, today we are introducing legislation to protect women,
physicians, and other health personnel, and public and private health clinics, from opponents
of abortion who resort to violence, blockades, and other vigilante tactics." Id. at S3523. The
senator spoke less than two weeks after Dr. David Gunn was murdered outside a clinic in
Pensacola, Florida. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
112. 139 CONG. REC. S3523 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993).
113. Id. at S3524. Several months later, Senator Kennedy, in a speech to his colleagues,
reiterated his plea for speedy congressional action to put a stop to the mounting violence.
"It is not enough for Congress simply to condemn this reprehensible conduct. Legislation
must be enacted before another doctor dies, or another clinic is blockaded or burned to the
ground." Id. at SI1,311 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1993) (remarks entitled, The Tragedy of
Continuing Anti-Abortion Violence).
114. The Freedom ofAccess to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 636 Before
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1993)
[hereinafter Hearing] (letter from William S. Sessions. Director, FBI, to Sen. Tom Harkin).
115. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 724 (deleting the Findings section in the Senate Bill but including some
of the factual findings in the Purpose section).
116. 139 CONG. REc. S3524 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993). The following is a partial text
of the findings:
SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings. - Congress finds that -
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which was to undergo four subsequent rewritings." 7 Dated May 13,
1994,"18 the fifth and final version incorporated House Bill 796, which had
become part of Senate Bill 636 on March 17, 1994." ' Thus, in tracking
the evolution of the Act, the development of the Senate Bill is more
instructive.
For two months following the introduction of Senate Bill 636 on March
23, 1993, co-sponsors were added at subsequent congressional sessions.' 21
The next significant event in the bill's evolution was the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee hearing on May 12, 1993.12' The testimony
given at the hearing 22 formed the basis for the committee report dated
(1) medical clinics and other facilities offering abortion services have been
targeted in recent years by an interstate campaign of violence and obstruction
aimed at closing the facilities or physically blocking ingress to them, and
intimidating those seeking to obtain or provide abortion services;
(2) as a result of such conduct, women are being denied access to, and health
care providers are being prevented from delivering, vital reproductive health
services;
(3) such conduct subjects women to increased medical risks and thereby
jeopardizes the public health and safety; ...
(6) such conduct operates to infringe upon women's ability to exercise full
enjoyment of rights secured to them by Federal and State law, both statutory and
constitutional, and burdens interstate commerce[;] ...
(10) the obstruction of access to abortion services can be prohibited, and the
right of injured parties to seek redress in the courts can be established, without
abridging the exercise of any rights guaranteed under the First Amendment
Id.
117. The fifth version was adopted by both the Senate and the House in May 1994 and
was sent to President Clinton to sign. 140 CONG. REC. H3135 (daily ed. May 5, 1994),
S5628 (daily ed. May 12, 1994), S5824 (daily ed. May 17, 1994); see also Full Text of Bills,
1994 S. 636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BTX103.
118. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488.
119. 139 CONG. REC. H1519 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
120. Bill Tracking Report, S. 636, supra note 108.
121. Hearing, supra note 114, at 1.
122. Senate Report 117 quotes extensively from the statements of two of the witnesses
at the hearing, Attorney General Janet Reno and Harvard University Law Professor Laurence
H. Tribe. S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., Ist Sess., pts. IV & V (1993), available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Cmtrpt File. Attorney General Reno expressed her opinion concerning the
need for federal legislation to discourage the use of violence during abortion protests. She
testified as follows:
This is a problem that is national in scope. It is occurring throughout the
country; on the doorstep of the Nation's Capital; in Alexandria and Falls Church
in northern Virginia; in Pensacola and Melbourne in Florida; in West Hartford,
1100 Vol. 19
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/9
Franco
July 29, 1993 and reported in the Senate the same day "with an amendment
in the nature of a substitute" of the Senate Bill.
23
This second version retained the congressional findings of fact outlining
the necessity for such legislation and defending its constitutionality. 24
But version two of the bill added four paragraphs to the original section
entitled, "Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose.' 1 25 These
CT; in Wichita, KS; in Fargo, ND, and Dallas, TX, just to name a few of the
more visible incidents. Moreover, much of the activity has been orchestrated by
groups functioning on a nationwide scale. Because of this nationwide scope, the
problem transcends the ability of any single local jurisdiction to address it.
Hearing, supra note 114, at 9 (statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United
States).
Professor Tribe testified concerning the ability of the Act as conceived to withstand the
expected constitutional challenges from its opponents:
[N]o court in the history of this country has ever suggested that the Bill of
Rights prevents Congress from limiting its prohibitions to those acts of force that
are deliberately intended by the actor to interfere with the finite, congressionally
specified set of activities or rights.
The first amendment just does not include any kind of 'all or nothing'
requirement.
Id. at 91. Professor Tribe also commented on a statement made by Professor Michael
McConnell regarding Senate Bill 636 that "Congress has selected a single point of
view-opposition to abortion-and subjected it to penalties applied to-no other point of
view." Id. at 92 (quoting Professor McConnell). He maintained that the "singling-out"
argument does not apply to the bill as written:
The ... objection ... completely misstates what this proposed bill does.
It does not select a point of view at all. What it selects is a specific lawful
activity-the provision of abortion services-and then it prohibits those acts and
only those acts that are intended to interfere forcibly with that specific lawful
activity.
Id.
123. S. REP. No. 117.
124. 139CONG. REc. S15,655-56 (daily ed.Nov. 16, 1993); seealsosupranotes 114-15
and accompanying text.
125. 139 CONG. REc. S 15,655-56 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993); see also S. REP. No. 117,
pt. V.C. (discussing the sources of constitutional authority permitting Congress to regulate
clinic access). The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources found that:
Congress has clear constitutional authority to enact [FACE] under the
Commerce Clause, which gives it authority to regulate interstate commerce.
... Further, once Congress finds that a class of activities affects interstate
commerce, Congress may regulate all activities within that class, even if any of
those activities, taken individually, has no demonstrable effect on interstate
commerce.
Id. at pt. V.C.1. The Committee also found that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides
independent authority to enact the Act because § I of the Amendment prohibits deprivation
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additional facts emphasized the national scope of the problem and clarified
the connection between the operation of the clinics and interstate com-
merce." 6 The statement of purpose in section 2(B) also added a reference
to "activities affecting interstate commerce" and empowered State Attorneys
General, together with the Attorney General of the United States, to bring
an action under the proposed statute. 2 7
In addition, the second version dropped two sections that mandated a
study of the effect of the proposed legislation on national reproductive
health services and that called for an investigation of past violations. 28
As a result of the latter deletion, FACE would not criminalize past offenses,
but only violations occurring subsequent to its enactment. Furthermore, the
second version expanded the definitions section to explain the words
"interfere with," "intimidate," and "physical obstruction," thus specifying the
types of conduct that the bill prohibited.'29
The most significant change was the expansion of the term "abortion
services" to read "abortion-related services" throughout subsequent Senate
versions."O This alteration of the language broadened the location of the
prohibited conduct to encompass clinics which counsel alternatives to
abortion, as well as those that provide abortion services. Finally, the July
1993 version added a fourth section "expressly provid[ing] ...that [the
Act] will apply only to conduct occurring on or after the date of its
of "liberty" without due process and § 5 gives Congress the power to enforce the
Amendment. Id. at pt. V.C.2. In Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the holding in Roe that a woman's right to choose abortion is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the Committee found two sources of constitutional authority to support
the congressional enactment.
126. 139 CONG. REC. S15.655-56 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
127. Id. at S15,656; S. REP. No. 117, pt. X.
128. 139 CONG. REC. S15,655 (daily ed.Nov. 16, 1993) (dropping proposed § 2715(c)-
(d) of version one); see also id. at S3524 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993) (setting forth text of
proposed § 2715(c)-(d)). The Senate version of the Act originally proposed inclusion of the
new provision ensuring clinic access in Title 42, the title governing public safety and welfare,
as § 2715. Id. at S3523. The sponsors reasoned that because the Senate bill was modeled
after the other civil rights legislation contained in this title, its rightful location would be in
Title 42, as an amendment of the Public Health Service Act, alongside such laws as §
1985(3). S. REP. No. 117, pt. V.A.1; see discussion supra part I.B. (discussing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1988) in the context of abortion clinic blockades); see also 139 CONG. REC.
S3523 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993) (introducing the bill in the Senate as a proposed amendment
to 42 U.S.C. § 300aaa).
129. 139 CONG. REc. S15,656 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
130. Id. at S15,655-56; see also S. REP. NO. 117.
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enactment," thus specifically prohibiting retroactive application of its
provisions. 3
1
The third version, dated November 16, 1993, contained several
substantive changes to the previous proposal. First, a new section, unrelated
to abortion services, was inserted to protect the exercise of religion "at a
place of worship."'32 Second, an addition to the proposed section govern-
ing penalties 3 distinguished between violent and nonviolent offenses,1
3 1
and reduced the maximum penalties for violations not involving force or the
threat of force, as proposed by Senator Kennedy. 35  The addition also
lowered the ceiling for criminal fines under Title 18 from $100,000 for first
offenses and $250,000 for subsequent offenses to $10,000 and $25,000,
respectively.'36 Third, an insertion in the pivotal first section. outlining
the prohibited conduct, changed "obtaining or providing abortion-related
131. 139 CONG. REC. S15.656 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993); S. REP. No. 117, pt. V.A.4.
132. 139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993). The full text of the proposed
section reads:
Whoever ... by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere
with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment
right of religious freedom at a place worship ... shall be subject to the penalties
provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedies provided in subsection (c) ..
Id. The phrase "at a place of worship" was subsequently changed in the final version of
FACE to read "a place of religious worship." 108 Stat. at 694 (emphasis added).
The Hatch Amendment, adopted on November 16, 1993, would "guarantee that
religious liberty is protected against Government intrusion. Through this amendment,
religious liberty would also be protected against private intrusion - in exactly the same way
that S. 636 would protect abortion." 139 CONG. REc. S15,660 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993)
(remarks of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). Senator Hatch was one of four senators of the seventeen-
member Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee to vote against adoption of the
proposed Senate Bill 636 on June 23, 1993. S. REP. No. 117, pt. 1.
133. 139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
134. Proposed § 2715(b)(2) was expanded with the insertion of the following provision:
[E]xcept that for an offense involving exclusively a nonviolent physical ob-
struction, the fine shall be not more than $10,000 and the length of imprison-
ment shall be not more than six months, or both. for the first offense: and the
fine shall be not more than $25,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not
more than 18 months, or both, for a subsequent offense ....
139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
135. Id. at S15,669.
136. Id. at S15,728; see also 140 CONG. REC. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994)
("Nonviolent obstructions of clinics do not warrant the same maximum penalties as violence,
death threats, or destruction of property.").
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services" to "obtaining or providing pregnancy or abortion-related servic-
es." '137 As in the change from the original version of Senate Bill 636 to
the second version, where the term "abortion services" was changed to
"abortion-related services," this last alteration again ensures that the bill will
prohibit the obstruction of clinics counseling alternatives to abortion, as well
as those performing abortions.
In addition, the November 1993 version of Senate Bill 636 added a
provision to the section specifying the Rules of Construction. The new
provision addressed possible abridgement of the First Amendment rights of
abortion protestors.'38 This addition specifically concerned freedom of
speech and expanded the fifth Rule of Construction included in the first two
versions of the bill, which states that "[n]othing in this section shall be con-
strued or interpreted to . . . prohibit expression protected by the First
Amendment .... '9 This same element was repeated in an additional
section, but was deleted in the enacted version of the bill. 40 Nonetheless,
its inclusion here indicates the adamant stance of the anti-abortion legislators
against the possible infringement of the protestors' rights to free speech and
the willingess of the pro-choice senators to compromise so that the bill
would be enacted.
On November 18, 1993, the House of Representatives debated its latest
version of House Bill 796 and added several amendments.' 4' Four months
later, the House voted to substitute its November 1993 version of the bill for
137. 139 CONG. REc. S 15,727 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (setting forth text of proposed
§ 2715(a)(1)) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at S15,728. Section 2715(d)(6) reads: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed or interpreted to... create new remedies for interference with expressive activities
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, occurring outside a medical facility,
regardless of the point of view expressed." Id.
139. Id.
140. The additional section contained the following language:
Sec. 4. Rule of Construction.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall be
construed to interfere with the rights guaranteed to an individual under the First
Amendment to the Constitution, or limit any existing legal remedies against
forceful interference with any person's lawful participation in speech or peaceful
assembly.
Id.
141. 139 CONG. REc. H10,093-94, H10,098, H10,109 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1993). The
full amended text can also be found in the Senate proceedings. 140 CONG. REc. S4183
(daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
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the then current version of Senate Bill 636142 by a recorded vote of 237
yeas and 169 nays, with twenty-seven Representatives not voting.'43 This
House amendment became the fourth version of Senate Bill 636.
During an impassioned late night" debate preceding the vote,
Representative McKinney, speaking in support of the Act, declared that
"[t]his bill is directed at terrorists and their malicious acts of violence.
These individuals are blocking real live Americans from exercising their
constitutional rights."'45 Representative Hyde spoke against the Act with
equal vehemence, encouraging his colleagues to "resist it because it
destroys, it shreds, it does violence to the constitutional precept of equal
protection of the law," by singling out anti-abortion protestors because of
their views. 4 6 These remarks highlight the sharp differences of opinion
among the members of Congress.
Similarly, a comparison of the House 4 7 and Senate'48 bills (version
three) illustrates the differences in the outlook between the two Houses.
The most obvious of these are as follows: 1) The Senate bill begins with
a Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, which is absent from
the House version; 49 2) the Senate bill amends Title 42 of the United
States Code governing the public health and welfare, while the House bill
appends its proposal to Title 18 of the Code, governing crimes and criminal
procedure; 3) the Senate bill refers to "pregnancy or abortion-related
services" throughout, while the House bill refers to "reproductive health
services;" 4) the Senate proposal includes a prohibition against interference
142. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in the third
version of Senate Bill 636).
143. 140 CONG. REc. H1519 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
144. Representative Schroeder, who moved to make the substitution, apologized for the
lateness of the hour, and continued: "In my entire tenure I have never seen us have to go
through this extraordinary procedure to go to conference on a bill that passed 69 to 30 in the
other body, and on the motion to recommit it here it was defeated 246 to 182." Id. at
H1 510. Thus, although a definitive majority in the House supported passage of the bill and
the need for a conference with the Senate to work out differences concerning the specifics
of the legislation, the debate dragged on as members rose to vent personal feelings. For
example, Representative Bunning disclosed that four members of his immediate family were
active in Operation Rescue, but he insisted that "[n]ot one of them poses any kind of threat
of violence whatsoever." Id. at H1500.
145. Id. at H1520 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
146. Id. at H 1513.
147. 140 CONG. REc. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994) (text of version four of the bill).
148. 139 CONG. REc. S15,727 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (text of version three of the
bill).
149. See supra notes 108, 114-15 and accompanying text.
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with the freedom of religion, which is absent from the House bill; 5 5)
the House bill does not include the distinction in penalties between violent
and nonviolent physical obstruction which the Senate version incorporated;
6) the Rules of Construction in both versions explicitly refer to First
Amendment protection of expression, but the Senate bill includes other
guarantees such as the right "to seek other available civil remedies;"''
and, 7) the Senate version defines "interfere with," as well as "intimi-
date."' 52 Thus, a conference was necessary to reach a viable compromise
between the House's blanket approach to stopping the violence and the
Senate's more narrowly defined solution to the problem.
In an accompanying motion, the House voted 228 in favor and 166
against, with thirty-nine members not voting, to "insist on its amendments
to [Senate Bill] 636 and request a conference with the Senate thereon."'5
A month later, the Senate agreed to the House's request for a confer-
ence.'54 On April 26, 1994, the conferees appointed by each chamber
agreed to file a conference report.'55 The resulting document highlights
the differences between the Senate and the House and the resolution of these
differences. 5 6  This compromise led to congressional enactment of the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 on May 26, 1994,11
and provided a new impetus for the deterrence of abortion-related violence.
C. Legislative Intent
In their separate committee reports recommending the enactment of
FACE, both the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources explained the purpose of the
150. 139 CONG. REC. S15,727 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (setting forth the text of
proposed § 2715(a)(2)).
151. Id. (setting forth the text of proposed § 2715(d)(4)).
152. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488 (listing the differences between the two
versions of the legislation before explaining the compromise reached).
153. 140 CONG. REC. H1519-20 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
154. Id. at S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994). Representative Mitchell requested that the
House version of Senate Bill 636 be presented to the Senate. Id. He then requested
"unanimous consent that the Senate disagree to the House amendments and agree to the
request for a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses ...
This request was also granted, and the presiding officer appointed nine conferees. Id.
155. Id. at D487 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994).
156. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488.
157. 140 CONG. REC. D627 (daily ed. June 7, 1994) (listing Senate Bill 636 as a new
public law, Pub. L. No. 103-259).
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legislation. 5 The House committee members intended that the Act
prevent the mounting violence generated by the abortion protest move-
ment. 59 In contrast, the Senate committee sought to protect a woman's
right to seek an abortion. 6 These two divergent points of view epitomize
the most significant difference between the House version of FACE and its
Senate counterpart: the House version 16' amended Title 18 of the United
States Code addressing criminal acts, while the Senate proposal amended
Title 42 of the Code safeguarding civil rights. 6  Thus, the House bill
emphasized the criminalization of the act of blocking abortion clinics, while
the Senate bill focused on preserving women's freedom of access to clinics.
Illustrative of this dichotomy are the descriptive headings each house
chose for the operative section of the bill. The House of Representatives
proposed an amendment to Title 18 by the addition of section 248 entitled,
"Blocking access to reproductive health services.' 63 The Senate proposed
an amendment to Title 42 by the addition of section 2715 entitled,
"Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances.' 64
The compromise in the enacted legislation was twofold: First, a
statement of purpose was included based on the one which appeared as a
preface to section 2715 in the Senate proposal, but omitting the extensive
list of congressional findings in Senate Bill 636.165 Instead, the House
proposed incorporation of part of the findings in the statement of purpose,
which also now refers to the imposition of "Federal criminal penalties" and
the provision of civil remedies for violations of the Act.' 66 The prefatory
statement also uses the word "violent" to describe the banned conduct, thus
highlighting the need for criminal penalties as well as distinguishing the
illegal violent conduct from legal nonviolent, peaceful activity. 67 Further-
158. H.R. REP. No. 306; S. REP. No. 117.
159. H.R. REP. No. 306, pt. I ("The purpose of the ... Act is to prevent the growing
violence accompanying the debate over the continued legality and availability ofabortion and
other reproductive health services.").
160. S. REP. No. 117, pt. V.C.2. ("The ... Act seeks to protect the right to terminate
a pregnancy, a right that falls squarely within the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
161. 140 CONG. REC. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
162. 139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16. 1993); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt.
3 ("Codification"); see also supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
163. 140 CONG. REc. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
164. 139 CONG. REc. S15,727 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
165. Id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 2.
166. 108 Stat. at 694 (quoting from "Sec. 2. Purpose."); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
488, pt. 2.
167. 108 Stat. at 694.
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more, the statement echoes the use of the word "intentionally" as found in
section 248(a), "Prohibited Activities," and adds the term "intended to" to
describe the banned conduct. 68 This addition also addresses the criminal
component of the legislation by indicating that conviction under the Act
requires intent.
Second, the title of the operative section is now a hybrid between the
two versions. While the legislation remains located within Title 18, Crimes
and Criminal Procedure, as the House favored, the inclusion of the concept
"Freedom of" in its name suggests a protected civil right, more appropriately
found under a Title 42 heading.'69
As a result of a further compromise between the two houses, the word
"abortion" appears only once in the Act, as part of the fourth Rule of
Construction.'70  The conferees agreed to replace the only reference to
abortion, which appeared throughout the Senate version in the phrase
"pregnancy and abortion-related services," with the House terminology,
"reproductive health services."' 7 ' Furthermore, in section 248(e)(5) the
phrase "including services relating to pregnancy or the termination of
pregnancy" is added to the definition of "reproductive health services." '
This substitution replaced the definition of "pregnancy and abortion-related
services" in the Senate's version of section 2715(e)(5). The phrase
"reproductive health services" better expresses the conferees' intent that
FACE apply to blockages of clinics that offer counseling on alternatives to
abortion, as well as clinics that provide abortion services. 173  Thus,
Congress intended that the Act be perceived as evenhanded, outlawing
blockades of abortion clinics by abortion protestors, as well as criminalizing
similar conduct by pro-choice demonstrators.
Several other alterations of section 248(e), containing definitions of key
terms, were intended to guard against challenges to the Act's constitutional-
168. Id.
169. Id.; 140 CONG. REc. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994); 139 CONG. REc. S15.727
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
170. 108 Stat. at 696 (setting forth the text of 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(4)). According to the
Conference Report, the word "abortion" was a concession to the Senate conferees for their
agreement to omit a provision from § 248(a)(1) that nothing in this section shall be
"construed as 'expanding or limiting the authority of States to regulate the performance of
abortions or the availability of pregnancy or abortion-related services."' H.R. CONE. REP.
No. 488, pt. 9(d). Thus, the word "abortion" can be said to have crept back into the Act
through the back door.
171. 108 Stat. 694; H.R. CONE. REP. No. 488, pt. 4.
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ity. For example, the conferees agreed to retain the Senate's inclusion of
a definition of the verb "interfere with," noting that the phrase "injure,
intimidate, or interfere with" is patterned after existing federal civil rights
laws, and that these terms are intended to have the same meaning. 74
Furthermore, the conferees noted that the language in section 248(a)
describing the person or class of persons against whom certain conduct is
proscribed also stemmed from existing federal civil rights laws.'7 5 By
carefully modeling this Act after existing legislation that has not fallen to
judicial challenge, Congress meant to avert an attack on the legislation's
constitutionality.
In addition, the final version of the Act retains the Senate definition of
"physical obstruction" as rendering access "hazardous." '176 The conferees
noted that this definition was taken from a Texas penal statute that has
withstood a First Amendment challenge. 77 Moreover, in a final supple-
ment to both versions of the bill, the House agreed to the inclusion of a
severability clause to guard against defeat of the whole Act should one part
be held unconstitutional. 7  These decisions concerning the content of
FACE indicate a cautious approach to the issue of the Act's constitutional-
ity, which has sometimes been absent in Congress' prior enactments.'79
In a coup for the Senate conferees, the oddly-placed prohibition against
interference with religious worship remained a part of the final enact-
ment. 8 But the House inserted the word "religious" before the word
"worship" in the reference to "place of worship" in section 248(a)(2). 8 '
Apparently, the House members of the conference committee intended to
ensure that this section did not create a new cause of action and remedy for
174. Id. at pt. 10(c).
175. Id. at pt. 5.
176. 108 Stat. at 696.
177. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 10(d).
178. Id. at pt. 11.
179. Devins, supra note 20, at 318-19. Devins asked, "Does elected government take
seriously its responsibility as constitutional interpreter?" Id. at 318. He then cited legislation
in which legislators did not concern themselves with the constitutionality of their legislation,
e.g., the AFL Demonstration Projects, and proposals of which Congress carefully examined
all the constitutional implications, e.g., the Freedom of Choice Act of 1989. Id. at 318-19
(footnotes omitted); see also supra note 93 (discussing the Freedom of Choice Act). Devins
concluded that the answer is neither yes nor no, but somewhere in between. Devins, supra
note 20, at 318.
180. 108 Stat. at 694; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 6.
181. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 6.
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interference with worship outside a clinic.8 2 The final version of section
248(d)(2) repeats this caution and also states that the Act shall not be
interpreted to create new remedies for interference with free speech.
8 3
Thus, the conferees concerned themselves with narrowing the scope of the
Act to avoid creating a new federal tort, as well as broadening it to include
free access to places of religious worship.
Overall, the final version of FACE is more concise than the Senate bill
and more cognizant of civil rights than the House bill. For example, the
lengthy Senate section on congressional findings and purpose was deleted
from the final version; the six Senate Rules of Construction plus the
additional section, "Rules of Construction," were pared down to four
rules.'84 But these four constitute two more than appeared in the House
version. 185
With respect to civil rights, the final version contains several safeguards
not present in the House bill. Two examples illustrate this focus on civil
rights in the Senate proposal. First, the finalized Rules of Construction
include a prohibition on limiting any existing causes of action for interfer-
ence with the exercise of free speech or the free exercise of religion.'86
This prohibition was absent from the House version. 8 7  This Rule of
Construction would safeguard a person's right of access to the courts and
thus his or her civil rights. Second, and more important, the House bill
omitted any restriction on who may bring a private suit.' Thus, the
House version may be interpreted as constraining the civil rights of the
protestors, since it created a potentially larger pool of plaintiffs who could
force them to defend their actions in court. In contrast, the Senate bill
provided more protection for abortion protestors by allowing fewer persons
the right to file a suit against them.
182. Id.
183. 108 Stat. at 696.
184. Id.
185. See 140 CONG. REc. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
186. 108 Stat. at 696; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 9(b).
187. See 140 CONG. REC. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
188. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1) reads: "RIGHT OF ACTION GENERALLY-Any
person who is aggrieved by a violation of subsection (a) of this section may in a civil action
obtain relief under this subsection." Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, the Senate bill limited
the person who may bring a private suit to someone either obtaining services from, or
providing services in, a clinic. 139 CONG. REc. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (setting




Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/9
Franco
However, most protective of civil rights is the retention of the Senate's
version of the penalties for violations of the Act."8 9 This section distin-
guishes between nonviolent and violent prohibited conduct by lowering the
maximum criminal fines and prison terms for nonviolent physical obstruc-
tion.' 90 In its final version, the bill creates different categories of offenses.
It punishes physical obstruction without force by fines and imprisonment
and it imposes stiffer fines and longer prison terms on violent obstruc-
tion.' However, it specifically excludes peaceful picketing from punish-
ment.'92 On the one hand, the bill is not meant to reach peaceful demon-
strators;' 93 but on the other hand, FACE contains stiff penalties for persons
who use violence to express their views.
Congress' intent in passing FACE was to stop "the massive wave of
violence, intimidation, and harassment directed at clinic patients and
personnel across the country."'94 To achieve this necessary end, Congress
created legislation to punish those who obstruct access to legal medical
services at clinics. The need for such a law is clear because the only cure
for a national campaign of violence is national legislation.'"
D. The Opposition
Throughout the congressional debate on FACE, the legislators opposing
FACE repeated several reasons for their opposition to the enactment of
legislation aimed at deterring abortion clinic blockades. 96 The foremost
189. 139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
190. 108 Stat. at 695; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 7(a); see also supra notes 124-27
and accompanying text.
191. 108 Stat. at 695.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1) (1988).
193. 140 CONG. REC. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994). According to Senator Kennedy:
Those who are picketing peacefully outside clinics, praying or singing, or
engaging in sidewalk counseling and similar activities that do not block the
entrances have nothing to fear from the law. Those activities are protected by
the first amendment. and this legislation does not restrict them.
Nor does this legislation discriminate against any particular viewpoint..
The only conduct it prohibits is violent or obstructive conduct that is far
outside any constitutional protection.
Id.
194. Id. at S5596-97 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
195. Id. at S5597.
196. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, pt. IX; H.R. REP. No. 306; 139 CONG. REc. S15,719
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993). According to Senator Smith, who was a vocal opponent of FACE
during the debate preceding the adoption of the third Senate version of the bill: "To sum up,
... there are five reasons why [Senate Bill] 636 should be defeated. First, it is extreme.
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criticism voiced by the minority was that the Act is not facially neutral and
instead, discriminates against the anti-abortion movement.
First, opponents accused the supporters of the bill of targeting the
movement because the current political fashion mandates a pro-abortion or
pro-choice point of view. 197 According to Senator Hatch: "Unfortunately,
[Senate Bill] 636 ... is not really about stopping violence outside abortion
clinics. It is about punishing purely peaceful civil disobedience on behalf
of a cause that is not politically correct."'9'
Second, opponents criticized the legislation as treating abortion
protestors unequally. According to the dissenting views appended to House
Report 306, the House bill did not protect abortion protestors, whose
activities take place outside a facility. 99 The language of the bill protect-
ed only those persons inside a facility who are "obtaining or providing
reproductive health services." 00 According to Senator Smith, the result
was that under the bill, a nun peacefully saying her rosary outside a clinic
subjects herself to imprisonment of up to eighteen months and fines of up
to $25,000 for blocking the entrance.2' 1 Opponents pointed out that al-
though the bill set lower jail terms and fines for nonviolent physical
obstruction, its failure to eliminate the penalty for a peaceful blockade
means that those who protest abortion are treated less favorably than owners
of abortion clinics or their patients.0 2
Furthermore, the members of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources who opposed adoption of the bill wrote in their dissent
that the proposal for ending violence at clinic entrances is hostile to the anti-
abortion point of view.20 3 They cited two examples of this hostility.
First, the legislation singles out the anti-abortion movement for penalties that
cannot be applied to other causes employing similar tactics. 2 4 This
singling-out occurs because the legislation prohibits physical obstructions
only of facilities providing reproductive health services.20 5 Second, the
Second, it sets a terrible precedent. Third, it is vague. Fourth, it is hypocritical. And fifth,
it is unconstitutional." Id. at S15,722.
197. 140 CONG. REc. S5598 (daily ed. May 12, 1994).
198. Id.
199. H.R. REP. No. 306 (referring to § 248(a)(1) printed in the House report).
200. Id.
201. 139 CONG. REc. S15,723 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
202. 108 Stat. at 695 (referring to § 248(b)(2)).
203. S. REP. No. 117, pt. IX.
204. Id.
205. 108 Stat. 694.
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bill uses vague and overbroad terminology that would chill free speech.2"6
The opponents contend that both these effects render the legislation
unconstitutional.207
Finally, opponents of the bill objected to the legislation as unnecessary.
They claim that existing state laws adequately protect abortion facilities and
that the Supreme Court decision in Scheidler2 "8 provided a suitable federal
remedy for clinic blockades. 2 9 House Report 306 pointed to the 70,000
arrests of abortion protestors in five years as evidence that local law
enforcement authorities can handle the protests without federal interven-
tion.2 0  Furthermore, the House report quoted from Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Bray and argued that existing federal statutes already
provide for federal assistance to local authorities.2" ' In addition, oppo-
nents of the bill pointed to the Supreme Court's holding in Scheidler that
abortion protestors violate the federal racketeering laws when they conspire
to force clinics out of business.2" With RICO2 3 available for use
against violent clinic blockades, opponents asserted that Congress should not
have enacted another federal law to solve the problem.
Supporters of the legislation pointed out, however, that state law cannot
deal effectively with a phenomenon that is interstate or one in which local
206. S. REP. No. 117, pt. IX (citations omitted). See also 139 CONG. REC. S15,723
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993), in which Senator Smith cited the term "physical obstruction" as
unconstitutionally vague, even though the bill includes a definition of the term in 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(e)(4). 108 Stat. at 696.
207. "[S]peech on issues like abortion lies at the core of first amendment protections.
.'[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' H.R. REP. No.
306 (quoting NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)). The dissent
concluded that any legislation that inhibits or chills free speech is unconstitutional. In
addition, House Report 306 cited another case that held that the government may not single
out speech because it disapproves of the topics presented. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)). Opponents of the bill assert that any hint of this type of
viewpoint discrimination would render it unconstitutional.
208. 114 S. Ct. at 798.
209. E.g., 140 CONG. REC. S5598 (daily ed. May 12, 1994). According to Senator
Hatch, state laws contain even more severe penalties for violent obstruction than the bill
would impose. Id.
210. H.R. REP. No. 306.
211. Id. Justice Kennedy suggested that 42 U.S.C. § § 10501, 10502(2)-(3) are available
to the states and local authorities. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring). These
statutes empower the United States Attorney General to use federal law enforcement
resources at the request of a state. Id.
212. Marcia Coyle, Clinics Win One: Justices Accept RICO Use Against Protesters;
Free Speech Challenge Lies Ahead, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1.
213. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
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authorities sometimes refuse to act."14 According to Attorney General
Janet Reno's testimony before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, "[t]he reluctance of local authorities to protect the rights of
individuals provides a powerful justification for the enactment of federal
protections that has been invoked previously by Congress in passing laws
to protect civil rights." '  Supporters of the bill also maintained that
RICO is not a forceful deterrent to the violence of abortion clinic blockades.
Under the federal racketeering laws, the clinic owners and users would have
difficulty in establishing the liability of the protestors."1 6 Thus, RICO
would be too unwieldy a legal tool for stopping the violent obstructions and
is not an adequate replacement for FACE.217
The overwhelming support for FACE in Congress deflated the
arguments of the bill's opponents against its passage.2"8 Nevertheless, of
all their objections to the Act, the minority argued most persuasively that the
Act constitutes a breach of the protestors' right to free speech. The
Supreme Court decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,219
handed down on June 30, 1994, declined to endorse the petitioners' free
speech arguments. 22' Although the context was a challenge to a state
court injunction and was not based on the newly enacted FACE, as a result
of the Court's decision, challengers of the new legislation may find it
difficult to convince the courts to overturn FACE on these First Amendment
grounds.
The Madsen decision, the third Supreme Court opinion on the abortion
issue in eighteen months, 221 is also noteworthy because it represents the
first judicial comment on abortion clinic blockades since the enactment of
FACE. The ruling constitutes an important milestone in the Act's progress
214. H.R. REP. No. 306.
215. Hearing, supra note 114, at 14 (statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General of the
United States); see also supra note 122 (quoting Attorney General Reno on the nationwide
scope of the abortion protests).
216. Coyle, supra note 212, at 37.
217. 140 CONG. REc. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994).
218. Id. at S5628 (presenting results of vote in the Senate on adoption of House
Conference Report 488, 69 yeas and 30 nays, with one Senator not voting); see also id. at
H3122-23 (recording the vote in the House of Representatives on the Conference Report, 236
yeas and 181 nays, with 15 Representatives not voting).
219. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
220. Id.
221. The three cases heard and decided by the Supreme Court since January 1993 are
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 753; Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 798; and Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516.
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toward judicial validation because it involved the same conduct that FACE
criminalizes: physical obstruction of abortion clinic entrances.
IV. THE MADSEN DECISION: THE FIRST STEP IN
PRESERVING FACE
The petitioners in Madsen22 2 challenged the constitutionality of a
Florida state court injunction that banned abortion protests.223 The
injunction restricted the time, manner, and place of demonstrations outside
a health clinic in Melbourne, Florida owned by the respondents.224 The
petitioners based their constitutional challenge to the court order mainly on
a violation of their First Amendment right to freedom of speech.225
However, the Court rejected the petitioners' First Amendment arguments in
part and upheld a provision of the injunction banning demonstrations and
picketing within a thirty-six foot "buffer zone" around the clinic ent-
rance.
226
222. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516. The petitioners here were three of the named
individual petitioners in the case heard by the Florida Supreme Court: Judy Madsen, Ed
Martin, and Shirley Hobbs. See Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 679.
223. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
224. Id. The Court noted that it granted certiorari because of a conflict between
Operation Rescue, upholding the injunction, and a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit striking down the same injunction. Id. at 2523 (comparing
Operation Rescue with Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (1993)). In Cheffer, the circuit
court struck down the injunction, reasoning that "[tihe clash . .. is between an actual
prohibition of speech and a potential hinderance to the free exercise of abortion rights."
Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711.
225. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. The petitioners brought several additional challenges
to the injunction. First, they claimed that it was vague and overbroad because the injunction
was applied to all persons or groups acting "in concert' with the petitioners. Id. at 2530.
Second, they objected to the "in concert" provision as an unconstitutional limit on their
freedom of association. Id.
The Court rejected the claims, reasoning that the petitioners lacked standing to sue on
behalf of parties not before the Court. Id. The Court held that in any case the provision is
neither vague nor overbroad, "but is simply directed at unnamed parties who might later be
found to be acting 'in concert' with the named parties." Id. With respect to the restriction
of the petitioners' freedom of assembly, the Court held that this First Amendment guarantee
"does not extend to joining with others for the purpose of depriving third parties of their
lawful rights," thus indirectly affirming that women have a legal right to seek medical
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To evaluate a possible infringement of the First Amendment rights of
the petitioners, the Court adopted the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation
of the injunction as addressing activities in a traditional public forum.227
Next, the Court followed Florida's lead in refusing to apply the strict
scrutiny level of analysis required for a content-based restriction of free
speech.22 Instead, it agreed with the Florida Supreme Court that the
restrictions against the abortion protestors were content-neutral.229 After
a detailed analysis of content-neutrality, the Court decided that the
injunction was unbiased because it did not discriminate against abortion
protestors based on their anti-abortion beliefs.23 Consequently, the Court
concluded that it should apply a lesser level of scrutiny in judging the
injunction's validity.23'
227. Id. at 2522; Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 671. The Florida Supreme Court
concluded that petitioners' protests took place on "public streets, sidewalks, and rights-of-
way," all of which fall within the definition of a traditional public forum. Id. at 671 (citing
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988)).
228. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522. The Florida court stated that under strict scrutiny the
state must prove that the restriction is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 671 (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
229. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
230. Id. The Court reasoned that "[a]n injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a
particular group (or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of that
group." Id. The Court concluded that the fact that the injunction covered only people who
were against abortion did not prove it was content-based, and therefore held that it was
content-neutral. Id. at 2524. In addition, the Court found no evidence in the record that a
Florida court would not issue a similar restraint for any such conduct, whether or not related
to abortion. Id. at 2523.
231. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524; Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 671. The level of
scrutiny identified by the Florida Supreme Court that covers content-neutral restrictions on
activities in a traditional public forum is intermediate. Id An intermediate level of scrutiny
asks whether the restrictions are "narrowly-tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Id. (using the standard
formulated in Perry for a lesser level of scrutiny).
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Under the test the Court developed for a content-neutral injunction, 2
it first held that the thirty-six foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances
and its driveway did not infringe on the protestors' First Amendment right
to free speech. 3  Subsequently, the Court found the limitations in the
injunction on the high noise levels near the clinic to be constitutional.234
The other contested provisions of the injunction were struck down as
violating the First Amendment rights of the abortion protestors.2" The
provisions that did not pass muster included a thirty-six foot protest-free
area on private property to the north and west of the clinic, and a 300-foot
zone in which protestors could not approach persons arriving at the
clinic. 6 In addition, the Court struck down a provision that would have
created a 300-foot zone around staff residences where protestors were
banned from demonstrating or using bullhorns. 7  The Court held that
232. The Court's new test for content-neutral injunctions is more stringent than the test
in Perry adopted by the Florida Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of the
injunction. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. The Court reasoned that an injunction requires
closer scrutiny than a similarly content-neutral statute because court-made orders carry a
greater risk of discrimination than generally applicable statutes. Id. Thus, the test the Court
formulated requires determining "whether the challenged provisions.. . burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest." Id. at 2525 (citations
omitted).
Both Justices Scalia and Stevens agreed with the majority's conclusion that the
injunction was content-neutral, in contrast to the holding of the Eleventh Circuit in Cheffer
that the injunction was content-based. See id. at 2531 (citing Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711). But
both disagreed with the majority and with each other concerning the correct level of scrutiny
to be applied to an injunction that does not discriminate on the basis of the expressive
message of the protestors. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525, 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), 2534 (Scalia, J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens would apply a more lenient standard. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, ridicules the
majority's standard as "intermediate-intermediate" and says it is "frankly too subtle for me
to describe." Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Instead, he would apply strict scrutiny to the injunction because, among other reasons,
discriminatory restrictions on speech are as much a risk in granting injunctive relief as in
passing a statute. Id. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the majority's distinction between
a content-neutral injunction and a similarly content-neutral statute is irrelevant. Id.
233. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
234. Id.
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these provisions "sweep more broadly than necessary" to achieve the
aims238 of the injunction.239
While the six to three24 Supreme Court decision in Madsen barring
protestors from a thirty-six foot clinic buffer zone might constitute a
temporary setback to the anti-abortion movement, 4 ' it does not signifi-
cantly affect the anti-abortionists long-term goal of shutting down abortion
clinics across the country.242 More important, the reasoning in Madsen,
though instructive as to the use of injunctive relief against abortion
protestors, is presumptively not applicable to a discussion of the possible
infringement of First Amendment rights in the context of a statute such as
FACE. The Court itself carefully made a distinction between an injunction
and a statute in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply in judging the
validity of an injunction. 243  As Senator Kennedy aptly pointed out a
month and a half prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Madsen, its
outcome has no direct bearing on the constitutionality of FACE because the
two contexts differ.244 The Madsen injunction creates a speech-free buffer
zone, whereas FACE provides penalties for specific protest activities.245
238. The Court agreed with the Florida court's holding that the protestors' obstruction
of clinic entrances affected four significant governmental interests. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at
2526. These interests included protecting a woman's access to legal medical services,
guarding the public safety, ensuring unobstructed traffic, and protecting property rights of
private citizens. Id.; see also Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 672 (discussing government
interests).
239. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
240. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2520. Justice Souter concurred in the
opinion; Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part; and Justice Scalia concurred
in the judgement in part and dissented in part in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined.
Id.
241. Craig Crawford, Justices 'Decision DealsAbortion Foes a Setback, SUN-SENTINEL,
July 1, 1994, at IA. The article also quoted several pro-choicers who considered the decision
a victory for abortion advocates. Id. For example, the director of a clinic in Lauderhill,
Florida that performs abortions was quoted as saying she was "very gratified" by the decision
and hoped the local authorities will now enforce the laws against clinic entrance obstruction.
Id.
242. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 667 n.3; see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying
text.
243. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524; see supra note 230.
244. 140 CONG. REC. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994).
245. According to Senator Kennedy, in Madsen the Court ruled on the constitutionality
of an injunction banning all protest activities within a specified buffer zone, even if the
activity does not block the clinic entrance. Id. The Senator contrasted this sweeping
prohibition with the narrowly tailored ban in FACE. which only forbids the physical
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Indirectly, however, any decision concerning the abortion issue is
instructive as to the current position of the Supreme Court. The Madsen
decision, reaffirming a woman's right to unobstructed access to abortion
services, may indeed signal the face of things to come. As such, the Court's
evolving position on the abortion issue may persuade anti-abortion groups
to refrain from mounting a free speech challenge to FACE's constitutional-
ity.
V. CONCLUSION: OPERATION RESCUE-AN EPILOGUE
Less than a week after the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Madsen in favor of abortion advocates, leaders of Operation Rescue and two
other anti-abortion groups organized what was billed as a massive protest
against FACE in Little Rock, Arkansas.246 Instead, police officers and
pro-choice supporters outnumbered anti-abortionists at the small gathering
to mark the start of the three-day "Summer of Justice" demonstrations, as
the challenge to FACE fizzled in the rain.247
The protest was the first nationally-mounted anti-abortion demonstra-
tion since the enactment of FACE, whose purpose is to stem the rising
violence during abortion clinic blockades.24 The resulting peaceful
encounter in Little Rock might have been a harbinger of the success of
FACE in discouraging Operation Rescue and its followers from using force
to eliminate abortion as an option for American women. More likely,
however, is that the recent spate of fatal shootings at clinic entrances249
highlights the usefulness of FACE as a prosecutory tool and not as the
deterrent to violence envisioned by its congressional sponsors.
Helen R. Franco
obstruction of entrances. Id. He also pointed out that the petitioners conceded the validity
of the parts of the injunction that banned clinic entrance blockades. Id. The Senator
concluded that the issue of clinic entrance blockades was not before the Court in Madsen and
therefore its outcome would not affect the more specific prohibitions in FACE. Id.
246. 60 Join Protest at 2 Arkansas Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1994, at A18
[hereinafter 60 Join Protest].
247. Id.; see also Arkansas: No Arrests as Pro-Life Demonstrations Begin, Abortion
Report, supra notes 20, 28 (daily ed. July 8, 1994). The spokesperson for the local police
department commented that the anti-abortion groups did not draw enough supporters for the
confrontation they planned. 60 Join Protest, supra note 246, at A18. "It looks like they
haven't gotten enough people here to do anything else than picket," the spokesperson said.
Id. (quoting Lieutenant Charles Holladay).
248. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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